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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the financial impact of the Fukushima reactor 
meltdown on the stock returns of German nuclear power providers. It was argued that the 
Fukushima incident affected these companies beyond the event itself, as it sparked a change to 
the political climate towards nuclear power. The day Chancellor Merkel announced the decision 
to end all nuclear power production in Germany by 2022 was deemed the most significant event 
after Fukushima. An event study was used to measure the effects of both events on a German 
sample and an EU sample. The results showed that the Fukushima reactor meltdown had a 
significant negative effect on nuclear power providers of both samples. The negative effect was 
explained by investors reassessing the risk of dealing with nuclear power and their reaction to 
new government policies. The announcement made by Chancellor Merkel also had a significant 
negative effect on German nuclear power providers. The negative effect was explained by the 
market reacting to the companies’ loss of expected future cashflows and the uncertainty 
regarding how they will adjust their business strategy. The financial loss experienced by the 
shareholders of the three German nuclear power providers was EUR -6,94 billion. 
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Esta tese tem como objetivo determinar o impacto financeiro da explosão do reator nuclear em 
Fukushima nos retornos das ações das empresas de energia nuclear alemãs. Após o incidente 
em Fukushima, as consequências para as empresas continuarem a ser visíveis, uma vez que este 
despoletou uma mudança política na perceção do uso da energia nuclear. O dia em que a 
Chanceler Merkel anunciou a sua decisão para acabar com a produção de energia nuclear até 
2022 foi, provavelmente, o evento mais relevante desde o incidente em Fukushima. Um estudo 
de evento foi utilizado para medir os efeitos de ambos os eventos numa amostra de empresas 
alemãs e da União Europeia. Os resultados mostraram que a explosão do reator nuclear em 
Fukushima teve um impacto significativamente negativo nas empresas de energia nuclear em 
ambas as amostras. O efeito negativo foi explicado pela reavaliação dos riscos da energia 
nuclear por parte dos investidores e pela sua reação às novas medidas políticas. Os anúncios 
feitos pela Chanceler Merkel tiveram igualmente um efeito negativo nas empresas alemãs de 
energia nuclear. Este efeito foi explicado pela reação do mercado às perdas de fluxo de caixa 
futuro por parte das mesmas empresas e pela incerteza em como estas irão ajustar a sua 
estratégia de negócio. A perda total experienciada pelos acionistas das três empresas de energia 
nuclear alemãs foi de -6,94 mil milhões de euros. 
 
Título: O impacto financeiro da explosão do reator nuclear em Fukushima no retorno das ações 
das empresas de energia nuclear alemãs 
Autor: Per Espen Schug 





This master dissertation is the biggest step in my academic career so far, and I feel like I have 
learned a lot through this experience. I would have never been able to accomplish what I did 
without the support of certain people in my life. Now, I would like to use this opportunity to 
express my thanks to those who have helped me along the way. 
 
Firstly, I wish to express my sincere thanks to Professor Geraldo Cerqueiro for being so 
supportive throughout the whole process of writing this dissertation. With his advice, I always 
had a clear view of what steps I needed to take next, in order to progress with my work. 
 
Secondly, I would like to thank Professor Adrian Baldock, from my undergraduate program, 
for teaching me the fundamentals of writing a dissertation. He prepared me well for the 
academic challenges I faced when writing this dissertation. 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for the encouragement and support during 
this very important time in my life. Special thanks go to my parents, who helped me overcome 
the emotional and financial challenges that this master program entailed. 
  
 iv 
Table of contents 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Fukushima reactor meltdown ...................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Political implications ................................................................................................... 1 
1.3 Research topic .............................................................................................................. 2 
1.4 European nuclear power industry ................................................................................ 3 
1.5 German nuclear power industry .................................................................................. 4 
1.5.1 E.ON ..................................................................................................................... 4 
1.5.2 RWE ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1.5.3 EnBW and Vattenfall ........................................................................................... 5 
2 Literature review ............................................................................................................ 5 
2.1 Event study methodology ............................................................................................ 5 
2.1.1 Advantages ........................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.2 Applications ......................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.3 Structure ............................................................................................................... 6 
2.1.4 Assumptions ......................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.5 Criteria .................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 Event studies ................................................................................................................ 8 
2.2.1 Event studies on natural disasters ......................................................................... 8 
2.2.2 Event studies on nuclear disasters ........................................................................ 9 
2.2.3 Event studies on Fukushima ............................................................................... 10 
3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 12 
3.1 Statistical methods ..................................................................................................... 12 
3.1.1 Calculations and parametric tests ....................................................................... 12 
3.1.2 Nonparametric tests ............................................................................................ 15 
3.2 Introduction to events ................................................................................................ 16 
3.2.1 Event 1 ................................................................................................................ 16 
3.2.2 Event 2 ................................................................................................................ 17 
3.3 Data and variables ..................................................................................................... 17 
3.3.1 Sample selection ................................................................................................. 17 
3.3.2 Data sources ....................................................................................................... 18 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics ........................................................................................... 18 
3.4 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................. 18 
 v 
3.5 Confounding events ................................................................................................... 19 
4 Results ............................................................................................................................ 19 
4.1 Event 1 ....................................................................................................................... 19 
4.1.1 German sample ................................................................................................... 19 
4.1.2 EU sample .......................................................................................................... 21 
4.2 Event 2 ....................................................................................................................... 22 
4.2.1 German sample ................................................................................................... 22 
4.2.2 EU sample .......................................................................................................... 23 
4.3 Extended event period ............................................................................................... 24 
4.4 Comparison to other studies ...................................................................................... 25 
4.5 Validation .................................................................................................................. 26 
4.5.1 Market efficiency ............................................................................................... 26 
4.5.2 Anticipation ........................................................................................................ 28 
4.5.3 Confounding events ............................................................................................ 28 
5 Discussion of findings ................................................................................................... 28 
5.1 Event 1 ....................................................................................................................... 29 
5.2 Event 2 ....................................................................................................................... 30 
5.3 Financial impact ........................................................................................................ 31 
6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 32 
Reference list ........................................................................................................................... 33 
Appendices .............................................................................................................................. 37 
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics ...................................................................................... 37 
Appendix B: Event study results ......................................................................................... 38 
Appendix C: Extended event window ................................................................................. 47 
Appendix D: Validation....................................................................................................... 49 




List of figures 
Figure 1.1: Stock Returns during the Fukushima Reactor Meltdown  ....................................... 2 
Figure 1.2: Energy produced by Nuclear Power Providers in Germany (2010) ........................ 4 
Figure 4.1: Event 1 - Cumulative Abnormal Return (MRM) - Germany  ............................... 27 




List of tables 
Table 4.1: Event 1 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - Germany  .......... 20 
Table 4.2: Event 1 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - EU  ................... 21 
Table 4.3: Event 2 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - Germany  .......... 23 
Table 4.4: Event 2 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - EU  ................... 24 




List of abbreviations 
ACSAR average cumulative standardized abnormal return 
AR abnormal return 
CAR cumulative abnormal return 
CMRM constant mean return model 
CSAR cumulative standardized abnormal return 
EU European Union 
EUR Euro 
Fukushima Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
mil. million 
MRM market return model 







1.1 Fukushima reactor meltdown 
On Friday 11 March 2011 at 2:46 p.m., an earthquake occurred off the east coast of Japan. With 
a magnitude of 9,0, it was the most powerful earthquake in Japan’s recorded history. It did a lot 
of damage to buildings in the region, but even more destructive than the earthquake itself was 
the tsunami it caused. The tsunami wreaked havoc across major cities and harbours along the 
east cost of Japan. The 15-meter high wave also critically damaged the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima). According to the World Nuclear Association (2017), the 
water masses cut the power supply to the cooling system of three nuclear reactors. As a result, 
the fuel-rods heated up uncontrollably and there was little that could be done to prevent a reactor 
meltdown. Other nuclear power plants in the region were also damaged, but it became rather 
clear that the situation in Fukushima was most severe (ARD, 2011). Three hours after the 
tsunami hit Fukushima, TEPCO, the owner of the power plant, fist declared a state of nuclear 
emergency. Two hours later, the Fukushima prefecture ordered people within a 2km radius to 
the power plant to evacuate. The next day, Japan’s Prime Minister extended the evacuation 
zone to 20km, which meant that more than 200.000 people were forced to evacuate the area 
around Fukushima. On 12, 14 and 15 March, hydrogen explosions occurred in reactors 1, 3 and 
4. Worst of all, a meltdown occurred in some of the reactors, and high levels of radiation were 
released into the air and water surrounding Fukushima. The nuclear power plant remained in a 
critical state until 15 March. On 26 December 2011, the Japanese government officially ended 
the incident (World Nuclear Association, 2017). 
1.2 Political implications 
This event had massive implications on nuclear power providers in Germany. Prior to 
Fukushima, the support of the federal government for nuclear power was very strong. In 
October 2010, all 17 nuclear power plants in Germany even received a lifetime extension of 12 
years on average (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010: 6). However, the political tune towards nuclear 
power changed drastically, following the meltdown in Fukushima. On Monday 14 March, 
Chancellor Merkel reacted to what had happened in Japan, and announced a 3-months long 
moratorium, which put the lifetime extension of German nuclear power plants on hold. 
Consequently, eight power plants were shut down immediately, while all had to undergo 
security tests. A day later, the EU-Energy Commissioner Oettinger hosted a summit meeting 
with political representatives from member states and the industry to discuss security standards 
of nuclear power plants within the European Union (ARD, 2011). This chain of events seems 
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to have negatively affected the stock returns of German nuclear power providers (Figure 1.1). 
On 30 May, Chancellor Merkel announced that the governing parties had decided to shut down 
all nuclear power plants in Germany by 2022. This decision was made official in the parliament 
on 30 June. The eight power plants shut down during the moratorium would remain switched 
off indefinitely, while the remaining nine nuclear power plants would gradually shut down until 
2022 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: This figure shows the cumulative stock returns of the German market index DAX and the 
three nuclear power providers E.ON, RWE and EnBW around the time of the Fukushima reactor 
meltdown. EnBW was in the process of being acquired by the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, which is 
why only few shares were in free float at that time. 
 
1.3 Research topic 
Over the past three decades, various event studies have been conducted on the effects of natural 
or manmade disasters on companies’ stock returns. For instance, Weiderman and Bacon (2008), 
tested the efficient market theory by looking at the effect of hurricane Katrina on stock returns 
of oil companies. Furthermore, Kalra et al. (1993) studied the effects of the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear accident on the stock prices of utility companies. 
This thesis aims to examine the financial impact of the Fukushima reactor meltdown on German 
nuclear power providers. For that, it is important to not only look at the event itself, but also at 
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the impact of the political decisions made as a reaction to Fukushima. After all, they had severe 
implications on the industry. As of yet, no existing research on Fukushima distinguishes 
between the two, by using separate events. The event study methodology will be used to answer 
the following research question: 
 
“What is the financial impact of the Fukushima reactor meltdown on the stock returns of 
German nuclear power providers?” 
 
To fully answer the research question, the following objectives need to be fulfilled: 
1. To compare and contrast theories on event study methodology. 
2. To identify the most significant events for nuclear power providers in Germany. 
3. To examine the effects of these events. 
4. To analyse the impact on shareholders. 
 
The 2011 Fukushima disaster has already been the topic of event studies, such as the one 
conducted by Ferstl et al. (2012). They tried to determine the effect of the meltdown on nuclear 
and alternative energy stocks world-wide. Ferstl et al. also included German nuclear power 
providers in their sample. However, they did not look at any effects beyond those of the event 
itself. 
This study will fill this research gap, by also incorporating a political event connected to 
Fukushima. That way, a more comprehensive financial impact on stock returns of German 
nuclear power providers can be determined. To put it all into perspective, the effects measured 
in Germany will be compared to the effects of other nuclear power providers in the European 
Union (EU). 
This dissertation will continue with a brief introduction to the European and German nuclear 
power industry, followed by a literature review, in which all the relevant theories and studies 
related to the topic will be presented. Then, the methodology used in this study will be 
explained. After that, the results will be analysed and discussed. Lastly, there will be a 
conclusion and a recommendation for future studies. 
1.4 European nuclear power industry 
In 2010, 14 countries in the EU operated nuclear power plants. Together, they supplied 871,3 
TWh of nuclear energy that year. That accounts to an average of 34% of the total electricity 
supplied in those countries (IAEA, 2011: 12f). At the time of the Fukushima incident, 10 of the 
nuclear power providers in the EU were publicly traded. 
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1.5 German nuclear power industry 
In 2011, the four energy companies that operated nuclear power plants in Germany are E.ON, 
RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall. They were also the four largest energy companies in Germany at 
that time. In 2010, the year before the disaster in Fukushima, they supplied German power grids 
with a total of 370,7 TWh. This accounted for 82,2% of all electricity fed into the grids for 
general supply (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011: 15). The same year, 140,5 TWh of electricity was 
produced in Germany through nuclear power (AGEB, 2011: 20). 
 
 
Figure 1.2: This figure shows the total energy produced by the four energy companies E.ON, RWE, 
EnBW and Vattenfall Europe in 2010. It also shows the amount of nuclear energy produced by each 
company in Germany that year. 
 
1.5.1 E.ON 
E.ON SE is a German energy company that generates electricity through nuclear power, oil, 
gas, coal and renewable energy sources in Central Europe, Nordic countries, the UK and 
Southeast Europe. The E.ON group produced 275,5 TWh of electricity in 2010, with 133,8 
TWh being produced in Central Europe (Figure 1.2). In Germany, 59,9 TWh were generated 
through nuclear power, meaning that nuclear power accounted for 45% of the total electricity 
produced by E.ON in Central Europe that year. Additionally, E.ON generated 12,1 TWh with 
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nuclear power in Nordic countries, which is the only region outside of Germany where it 
operates nuclear power plants (E.ON, 2010: 14). 
1.5.2 RWE 
Apart from nuclear power, the German energy company RWE AG also generates electricity 
through coal, gas, oil and renewable energy in Great Britain, Netherlands, Belgium and 
Southeast Europe. In 2010, the RWE Group produced a total of 329,7 TWh of electricity, of 
which 192,3 TWh were generated in Germany. Nuclear power accounted for 45,2 TWh that 
year, which is nearly 25% of the total electricity produced by RWE in Germany. Its nuclear 
power is exclusively produced in Germany (RWE, 2010: 76). 
1.5.3 EnBW and Vattenfall 
EnBW AG produced 65,5 TWh of electricity in 2010, where 33,4 TWh stemmed from nuclear 
power plants (EnBW, 2010: 3). In the same year, Vattenfall Europe AG generated 68,9 TWh 
in total and 2,1 TWh through nuclear power (Vattenfall Europe, 2010: 25). At that time, 
Vattenfall Europe AG was a holding company, owned by the Swedish energy company 
Vattenfall AB, which produced 172,5 TWh of electricity in 2010 and 43,6 TWh through nuclear 
energy (Vattenfall AB, 2010: 34). 
2 Literature review 
The following literature review aims to establish the theoretical background for the research 
question. Relevant theories and results of similar event studies will be summarised, compared 
and critically reviewed. 
2.1 Event study methodology 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997: 626) define the event study as a tool to measure the effect of an 
unanticipated event on stock returns. The magnitude of the abnormal returns during an event 
give information about the impact of the event on the company’s shareholders (MacKinlay, 
1997: 13; Kothari and Warner, 2007: 5). An event study looks at the effect on a specific class 
of security. Most of the time it is common equity (MacKinlay, 1997: 13).  
One of the first event studies was conducted by James Dolley (1933), who studied the price 
effects of stock splits. In the next 40 years, the methodology became more sophisticated, as 
researchers started to control for confounding events and removed unwanted effects. For 
instance, Fama et al. (1969) removed the effects of simultaneous increases in dividends, when 
studying stock splits. The methodology used today is still very similar to the one used by Fama 
et al. (1969) and other researchers at that time (MacKinlay, 1997:13). 
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2.1.1 Advantages 
The fact that event studies look at stock returns has a number of advantages. According to 
Benston (1982: 210), these types of economic measures give a better indication about a 
company’s true performance than accounting-based measures, since the latter can be 
manipulated by managers. McWilliams and Siegel (1993: 626) agree that stock prices are less 
susceptible to manipulation and add that they give a better estimate of the true value of a firm. 
The reason for that is that a company’s share price is said to be based on the discounted value 
of all its future cash flows. Hence, all relevant information about the firm is also priced into it. 
Since event studies examine the effect of an event on a company’s stock returns, they should 
provide a more accurate picture of the effect than an accounting-based method (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997: 627). 
2.1.2 Applications 
Event studies are used to measure the effect of events related to finance, economics, accounting, 
law and management (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 
2007). In their definition, McWilliams and Siegel (1997: 626) differentiate between 
endogenous and exogenous events. Endogenous events are events inside the control of a 
company, such as employee layoffs or corporate control changes. Exogenous events are outside 
the control of a company, like announcements of new legislations or liability cases. Moreover, 
event studies with shorter event windows are better suited to provide insights on the effects of 
corporate policy decisions (Kothari and Warner, 2007: 5). Event studies with longer event 
windows can be used to test market efficiency, as it is assumed that markets react very fast to 
new information. Thus, the effect of an event is not expected to persist long after the event took 
place (Fama, 1991: 1601). 
2.1.3 Structure 
MacKinlay (1997: 14f) explains that an event study consists of an event window and an 
estimation window. At first, the event window only includes the day of the event. However, it 
is common to add days surrounding the event day to the period. A typical event window consists 
of the event day and the day after. That way, the effects can be captured that occur after market 
close. Days prior to the event can also be included in the event window, especially, if there is a 
concern that information has leaked to the public. The impact of an event can be determined by 
measuring the abnormal return. The abnormal return is the actual return minus the expected 
return of the security. The expected return is the return that would have been expected had the 
event not taken place. It can be modelled in multiple ways. Two examples are the constant mean 
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return model and the market return model. In the constant mean return model, the stock return 
is expected to be constant over time. With the market return model, it is assumed that there is a 
stable linear relation between the return of the security and the return of the market. The 
estimation window should be a period of 120 days before the event and is used to either 
calculate the mean return or to estimate the market model parameters. McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997: 628) recommend a slightly longer estimation window of up to 250 days before the event. 
However, the estimation window should not include days from the event window, since that 
could lead to the event influencing the calculated expected return of the company (MacKinlay, 
1997: 15). 
The goal of an event study is to produce results that shed light on the root cause of the effects 
generated by the event (MacKinlay, 1997: 15f). Therefore, the abnormal returns need to be 
explained by showing that the results are consistent with some kind of theory (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997: 638). However, before any conclusions can be drawn from the results, it needs to 
be determined whether the abnormal returns are significant. 
2.1.4 Assumptions 
According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997: 629), the following three assumptions must be 
true, in order to be able to infer the significance of an event: markets are efficient, the event 
unanticipated and there are no confounding events during the event period. If all three 
assumptions are true, researchers can be more confident that they captured all abnormal returns 
related to the event. 
Market efficiency means that all relevant information available to the market is very quickly 
priced into the share price of a company (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997: 630). If this assumption 
is deemed to be true, it is difficult to justify long event windows. An event is unanticipated if 
there was no knowledge about the event, prior to its announcement. If there were leakages of 
information or the event was anticipated, it becomes difficult to determine at what point in time 
the market first became aware of the information. Confounding events are events that can have 
a financial impact on a company and take place around the same time as the studied event. They 
make it difficult to isolate the effect of the event in question from other effects. For that reason, 
they weaken the validity of the test results (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997: 630ff). 
Lastly, there are also some criticisms when it comes to event studies. Fama (1991: 1602) 
criticises that event studies do not paint a clear picture on how much of the abnormal returns 
can be explained by a rational reaction of the market to the information. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges that this is only a minor criticism, and that event studies produce the cleanest 
evidence of market efficiency. Furthermore, Binder (1985: 371) claims that in the market return 
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model with a simple linear regression, the abnormal returns of the firms in the sample are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed. However, when these firms operate in 
the same industry and are tested on an event in the same calendar period, the abnormal returns 
are not truly independent, nor is it likely that they are distributed equally among all companies. 
To avoid this problem, he suggests using a multivariate regression instead of a linear regression. 
2.1.5 Criteria 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997: 629f) identified five criteria that need to be considered when 
using an event study methodology: the size of the sample, nonparametric tests to identify 
outliers, the length of the event window, confounding events and an explanation of the 
abnormal returns. For event studies, small sample sizes are problematic, since the test statistics 
are based on the normal distribution assumption for large samples (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997: 634). MacKinlay (1997: 15) recommends to present summary statistics when dealing 
with small samples, since the distribution can be strongly influenced by a few outliers. 
Moreover, it is important to choose the right length for the event window. The length should be 
based on the nature of the event (Ryngaert and Netter, 1990: 257). Using a long event window 
could indicate that the researcher believes that markets are inefficient or that the event was 
anticipated. They also make it more difficult to control for confounding effects (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997: 650). Generally, short event windows are said to be sufficient to capture the 
effect of an event, assuming that markets are efficient (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997, 636). 
2.2 Event studies 
Now that the theory has been explained, it makes sense to look at studies that have been 
conducted on events similar to the one used in this paper. That way, the results of this paper 
can later be compared to existing literature. 
2.2.1 Event studies on natural disasters 
In 2005, the Gulf of Mexico was hit by the devastating Hurricane Katrina. Weiderman and 
Bacon (2008) used this disaster to test the market efficiency theory. In their study they observed 
the effect of the hurricane on stock returns of 15 oil companies (Weiderman and Bacon, 2008: 
11). Their results revealed that the hurricane had a significant negative impact on stock returns. 
Their findings also indicated a semi-strong market efficiency, as the stock returns began to drop 
significantly up to 25 days before the day Hurricane Katrina reached New Orleans. According 
to Weiderman and Bacon (2008: 11), this showed that the market was quick to anticipate the 
destruction that Hurricane Katrina would cause. 
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In addition, Yamori and Kobayashi (2002) conducted an event study on the impact of the 1995 
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake on Japanese insurance companies. Due to the destruction caused by 
the earthquake, insurance companies had to make very high insurance payments. With their 
study, they actually set out to measure whether Japanese insurance companies had benefited 
from the disaster. The thesis behind it was that demand for insurance coverage would increase 
after natural disasters (Yamori and Kobayashi, 2002: 93). Yamori and Kobayashi (2002: 101) 
used a sample of 13 insurance companies. Their results showed that abnormal returns on the 
day of the earthquake were negative and highly significant for most companies in the sample. 
Furthermore, they found that the market reacted efficiently, as the cumulative abnormal return 
was only significantly negative right after the earthquake. Yamori and Kobayashi (2002: 107) 
conclude that the negative impact of earthquakes on the financial condition of Japanese 
insurance companies outweigh the benefits caused by the higher demand for insurance 
coverage. 
Both Weiderman and Bacon (2008) and Yamori and Kobayashi (2002) found that natural 
disasters have a negative impact on the stock returns of effected companies and that the market 
is very efficient at incorporating the new information of the unanticipated event in their 
assessment of a company’s stock price. These studies also show that the event study 
methodology is applicable to natural disasters and that it is possible to get statistically 
significant results with fairly small sample sizes. These findings strengthen the confidence in 
this paper’s research design, as it also deals with the impact of a natural disaster on companies’ 
stock returns and relies on a relatively small sample size. 
2.2.2 Event studies on nuclear disasters 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant, owned by GPU, suffered a reactor meltdown 
in 1979. It was the most significant commercial nuclear energy accident in the United States. 
Hill and Schneeweis (1983) studied the effects of the incident on the monthly risk-adjusted 
returns of 64 U.S. electric utility companies. They also divided their sample into two 
subsamples, consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear utility companies (Hill and Schneeweis, 
1983: 1285). They found that the reactor meltdown had a significant negative effect on the 
stock returns for both nuclear and non-nuclear utility companies. However, the impact was 
larger for nuclear companies. Hill and Schneeweis (1983: 1291) interpreted the negative effects 
of the TMI reactor meltdown on utility companies, as the market anticipating the long-term 
costs of operating nuclear power plants to increase, due to the possibility of new safety 
regulations being imposed by the government. Nevertheless, Hill and Schneeweis (1983: 1291) 
also acknowledged that confounding events, such as the introduction of new environmental 
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regulations, had an effect on the returns of the utility companies. Since their event window was 
25 months long, it is very likely that confounding events affected their results. 
In another study, Kalra et al. (1993) examined the effect of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident 
on stock returns of U.S. utility companies. The accident in Chernobyl was different to the TMI 
accident in the way that the Soviet government withheld information about the severity of the 
incident. In their study, they used a sample of 69 companies and split them into three portfolios, 
based on their nuclear capacity. The portfolios were nuclear, mixed and conventional utility 
companies. The day the news about Chernobyl first reached the U.S. was recognized as the 
event day (Kalra et al., 1993: 55f). The results showed that all three portfolios experienced 
significant negative abnormal returns. However, the abnormal returns of the nuclear and 
conventional portfolio were relatively small, compared to the abnormal returns of the mixed 
portfolio. Kalra et al. (1993: 62) argued that this could be explained by the fact that most 
companies in the mixed portfolio were committed to sizably increasing their nuclear capacity 
but were still awaiting approval. Hence, there was more uncertainty about the future strategy 
of these companies, as the Chernobyl accident could influence the probability of the 
government granting approval. 
2.2.3 Event studies on Fukushima 
Kowashima and Takeda (2012) applied the event study methodology to the 2011 Fukushima 
reactor meltdown. In their paper, they investigated the effects of the incident on nine Japanese 
electric utility companies, which were not directly damaged by the earthquake. That way, they 
could measure the effect on the market’s assessment of risk and return associated with 
generating nuclear power in general (Kowashima and Takeda, 2012: 2032). Their results 
showed that the negative abnormal returns were more significant for companies that owned 
nuclear power plants than for those that did not. From that, Kowashima and Takeda (2012: 
2036) concluded that the market anticipated the costs of operating nuclear power plants to 
increase, due to possible new regulation. They also measured an increase in systematic and total 
risk after the Fukushima incident. Based on that, they interpreted that the negative cumulative 
abnormal returns were not caused by a one-time loss, but rather by a structural change in society 
and regulation. These results strengthened their first conclusion. 
Ferstl et al. (2012) expanded the scope by examining the effects of the Fukushima incident on 
nuclear and alternative energy stocks worldwide. They conducted an event study on nuclear 
power and alternative energy providers from France, Germany, Japan and the USA with two 
event windows. One to determine the immediate effect of the meltdown and another to measure 
whether the effect was only temporary. They found significant negative abnormal returns for 
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nuclear energy companies in Germany, France and Japan, while there were no significant 
returns for U.S. companies. However, the cumulative abnormal returns of German and French 
companies were only significant at the 10% level. In contrast, the abnormal returns of 
alternative energy companies were significantly positive for most countries (Ferstl et al., 2012: 
30). In the post event window, the cumulative abnormal returns for German nuclear power 
providers was not significant. Ferstl et al. (2012: 33) explained these findings with the market 
quickly anticipating new government policies in favour of alternative energy. Furthermore, they 
found an increase in volatility for stock prices of Japanese nuclear power providers, suggesting 
that this stemmed from uncertainty of the market regarding new government regulations. Their 
conclusion coincides with the conclusion drawn by Kawashima and Takeda (2012). 
Contrary to the previous two studies, Betzer et al. (2011) looked at how changes in the political 
climate, following Fukushima, affected German nuclear and renewable energy providers. Their 
first sample consisted of three nuclear power providers and their second sample of 35 renewable 
energy companies from a German renewable energy index. They defined the day of the 
earthquake as the event day and their event window was 22 days long, starting that day (Betzer 
et al., 2011: 11). Their results revealed significant negative abnormal returns for the nuclear 
sample on the day of the event. The abnormal returns for renewable energy providers were 
significantly positive that day. The results of the cumulative abnormal returns showed that 
almost all information was incorporated into the stock prices on the day of the event, indicating 
a high market efficiency. Furthermore, the effects were persistent over the event period (Betzer 
et al., 2011: 12f). Based on that, they concluded that the effects were caused by changes in the 
political climate after Fukushima (Betzer et al., 2011: 18). 
All three studies arrive at the conclusion that the observed abnormal returns experienced by 
those companies were not caused by the event directly, but rather by the market anticipating 
new government policies that make operating nuclear power plants costlier. Therefore, this 
paper will look at the political events that followed Fukushima in more detail, to get a better 






3.1 Statistical methods 
The methodology recommended by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) served as the template for 
this paper’s event study. 
3.1.1 Calculations and parametric tests 
To estimate the expected returns of the companies in the sample, the market return model 
(MRM) and the constant mean return model (CMRM) were used. McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997: 628f) describe that with the MRM, the expected return can be estimated using ordinary 
least squares parameters α and β, derived from a regression of the rate of return of company 𝑖𝑖 
on day 𝑡𝑡 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) on the rate of return of a market portfolio on day 𝑡𝑡 (𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖). The 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
The abnormal return (𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅) is the difference between the actual return on an event day and the 
expected return. With the MRM, the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 of company 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑡𝑡 (𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) can be calculated the 
following way: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) 
 
Alternatively, the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 can be calculated with CMRM. In that case, the expected return (𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖]) 
is the mean of the 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 from the estimation window with 𝑇𝑇 days. It can be calculated like this: 
 








The 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 of the CMRM is, again, the actual return minus the expected return: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖] 
 
MacKinlay (1997: 18) argues that the MRM potentially leads to better results than the CMRM, 
as it reduces the variance of the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 and, therefore, captures more of the effects caused by the 
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event. The smaller the variance of the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠, the more accurate the results. Nevertheless, the 
results of the CMRM will serve as a comparison to the results of the MRM. 
To test the null hypothesis of no abnormal return, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is divided through the standard deviation 

















The significance level is based on 𝑇𝑇 − 2 degrees of freedom. 
The 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 from all days in the event window with 𝑘𝑘 days can be summed up, which leads to the 
cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅). It aggregates all measured effects of the event on company 




















In this formula, 𝑆𝑆2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 is the variance of the residuals from the estimation window.  
Additionally, it makes sense to also calculate the standardized abnormal return (𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅). This 
method was first introduced by Patell (1976). Through standardization, each abnormal return 
has the same variance (Serra, 2002: 5). To obtain the 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅, the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 is standardize by dividing it 




















Here, 𝑆𝑆2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 is adjusted by the predicted error, where 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚���� is the average return of the market 
portfolio in the estimation window. The sum of the 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 over all event days is called the 










By dividing the 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 through their standard deviation (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), their values are identically 
distributed, making them in line with parts of the underlying assumption of independent and 
identically distributed 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠. The 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 can then be averaged across the sample. The average 
standardized cumulative abnormal return (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅) on day 𝑡𝑡 for all companies 𝑛𝑛 is calculated 




















The 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 displays the average effect of the event on the companies in the sample. To test 
whether the value for the 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is significantly different from zero, the following test statistic 
can be used: 
  
𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 × 𝑛𝑛0,5 
 
If the 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is significantly different from zero, it means that the event had a significant 
effect on the stock returns of the 𝑛𝑛 companies. The results can then be analysed. Although, 
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there is still the issue of covariance of 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 across companies, when the calendar dates of the 
event window are the same for all companies in the sample (MacKinlay, 1997: 27). To 
circumvent this issue, the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 will additionally be analysed without aggregation across 
companies. 
3.1.2 Nonparametric tests 
According to Serra (2002: 7), parametric tests are not so reliable at testing the null hypothesis 
of no abnormal return since these tests depend on the assumption of normality. However, 
abnormal returns are often distributed with fat tails and positively skewed. Nonparametric tests 
are free of those assumptions regarding the distribution and potentially yield more powerful 
results. Nevertheless, nonparametric tests are typically only used in combination with 
parametric tests and serve as a robustness check for the conclusion based on the latter 
(MacKinley, 1997: 32). In this paper, the generalized sign test and the Corrado rank test were 
used, based on the template provided by Serra (2002). 
The generalized sign test is a binomial test that measures differences between the fraction of 
non-negative abnormal returns in the estimation and the event window. Under the null 
hypothesis of no 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅, the average fraction of non-negative 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 across all firms at the end of the 
event window (𝑝𝑝0) is not significantly different to the average fraction of non-negative 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 




















Here, 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 1 if the abnormal return is positive and 0 if it is negative. 
The Corrado rank test measures the significance of the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 from the event period by ranking 






























In this formula, 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the rank of the abnormal return of company 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 is the expected 
rank of an abnormal return of company 𝑖𝑖, estimated over a period including the number of days 
of the estimation window 𝑇𝑇 and the event window 𝑘𝑘. 
3.2 Introduction to events 
To examine the effects of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown on the German nuclear power 
industry, an event study with two separate events will be used. One is the disaster itself and the 
other is a significant political event. 
3.2.1 Event 1 
The first event is the Fukushima reactor meltdown, which took place on 11 March 2011. The 
incident itself did not damage any Germany nuclear power providers directly. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that it indirectly, negatively impacted the stock returns of German nuclear power 
providers. For one, it reminded the market about the risks involved when dealing with nuclear 
technology. Secondly, the market arguably anticipated that the incident would lead to a shift in 
the political climate, making the operation of nuclear power plants costlier. These theories are 
backed up by the findings of the studies presented in the previous chapter (Kowashima and 
Takeda, 2012; Ferstl et al., 2012; Betzer et al., 2011). 
The situation in Fukushima was critical from 11 March until 15 March. The event window will 
be limited to the time span of these days, since new information about the incident was reported 
most intensely in this period. 11 March is the event day (0) and the event window spans for 
three days (0, 2). 12 and 13 March are a weekend, which is why they are not included in the 
event window. Due to the nature of the event, it can be said with absolute certainty that the 
event was unanticipated and that there was no leakage of information before the event day. 
Therefore, the event window does not include days before the event day. The estimation 
window spans a period of 250 days and ends a day before the Fukushima incident (-250, -1). It 
has to end a day before the event, so that no effects of the event are included in it. 
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3.2.2 Event 2 
The second event is the day Chancellor Merkel announced that all nuclear power plants in 
Germany were required to shut down indefinitely by 2022. This announcement occurred 
through a press conference on 30 May 2011 and was somewhat of a turning point, as it sealed 
the fate of the future of nuclear energy in Germany. Another potential event was 30 June, which 
was the day the decision was made official in parliament. However, it was deemed ill-suited, 
because there was little uncertainty around its outcome. The day Chancellor Merkel announced 
the 3-months long moratorium is another alternative, but its effects are already included in the 
first event window. For these reasons, the announcement by Chancellor Merkel on 30 May is 
the second event for this study. 
Contrary to event 1, it is difficult to argue that the second event was unanticipated. Ever since 
the Fukushima disaster, there was an ongoing and open political discussion on the future of 
nuclear power. With the immediate decision on the moratorium for nuclear power in March, 
Chancellor Merkel already proved that she had drastically changed her tune towards nuclear 
power. Therefore, it can be assumed that the decision made on 30 May was somewhat 
anticipated. However, there was still uncertainty about the severity and timeframe of the 
implementation, should it come to the decision to shut down all nuclear power plants. For these 
reasons, the event window around the event day will be covering 2 days before and 2 days after 
(-2, 0, 2). The estimation window will be the same 250 days as for event 1, so that the 
confounding effects of the Fukushima disaster do not influence the estimated expected returns. 
3.3 Data and variables 
Now that the events have been defined, it makes sense to explain on what companies the effects 
of the events are measured. 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
The event study for both events will be conducted on two samples. The first sample only 
includes German nuclear power providers and the second sample consists of other nuclear 
power providers in the EU. By using these two samples it is possible to see if the effects of the 
two events were different for German nuclear power providers than for those of other EU 
countries. This is particularly interesting for the second event, since the political event only 
directly affected German companies. 
The first sample consists of E.ON, RWE and EnBW, since they were the only publicly traded 
nuclear power providers in Germany at that time. As mentioned in chapter 1.5.3, the Swedish 
company Vattenfall AB also operated nuclear power plants in Germany at that time, through 
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its subsidiary Vattenfall Europe. However, neither Vattenfall AB nor Vattenfall Europe were 
publicly traded at the time of the events, which is why they were excluded from this sample. 
EnBW was in the process of being acquired by the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg during event 
1. As a result, only few shares of EnBW were in free float at that time. For that reason, the 
effects of event 1 on EnBW are expected to be rather small. For this sample, the DAX 30 was 
used as the market portfolio for the regression of the MRM. 
The second sample consists of all seven remaining nuclear power providers in the EU that were 
publicly traded at the time of the disaster. This sample includes companies from Spain, France, 
Finland and the Czech Republic. All other nuclear power providers in the EU were not publicly 
traded at that time, rendering them unsuitable for this event study. The Euronext 100 was used 
as the market portfolio for this sample. The list with all the companies in this sample can be 
found in Table 1 of Appendix E. 
3.3.2 Data sources 
To conduct this event study, it is necessary to have the daily stock returns of all companies over 
the estimation and the event windows. The daily stock returns were calculated using the daily 
closing prices, derived from Thompson Reuters DataStream. The 3-months German Bund was 
used to calculate the daily excess returns. Its yield was also derived from Thompson Reuters. 
The market capitalization was calculated with the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
2010, found in the annual report of the respective company. 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
For the German sample, the mean of the ARs from the estimation window is almost 0, with a 
slightly higher median, for all companies (Table 1 in Appendix A). The standard error of the 
ARs is lower with the MRM than it is with the CMRM in all cases. Based on that, it can be said 
that the MRM is the better estimate of the expected return. The average excess kurtosis is very 
high, particularly for EnBW, meaning there is a high probability of obtaining extreme values. 
For E.ON and RWE, the ARs are negatively skewed, which means the probability of obtaining 
extremely negative ARs is higher. For EnBW, the skewness is positive. In the end, it can be 
said that the ARs of both models are not normally distributed. The distribution of the ARs from 
the EU sample is similar, yet slightly closer to a normal distribution. 
3.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the findings of other literature and the reasons given in chapter 3.2.1, it is expected 
that event 1 had a negative impact on the stock returns of nuclear power providers in Germany 
and the EU. As was explained in chapter 3.2.2, the effect of event 2 is also expected to be 
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negative for the German sample. For the EU sample, the effect is expected to be negative as 
well, since the market could have anticipated the governments of other EU countries to follow 
the example of Germany, regarding their stance on nuclear power. These hypotheses will be 
tested on 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 and 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 for companies individually. Then, they will be tested on 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 and 
nonparametric tests for the samples as a whole. 
3.5 Confounding events 
Both samples contain some companies that are multinational, which would increase the chance 
of confounding events. However, the length of the event windows is relatively short for both 
events, which would reduce their likelihood. In this paper, the ARs of companies are eliminated 
from the sample, for the day of the confounding event. This is one of the methods suggested by 
Foster (1980) to control for such effects and was used in similar studies, like the one conducted 
by Ferstl et al. (2012). The recognized confounding events will be presented in chapter 4.5.3. 
4 Results 
In this chapter, the results of each sample will be presented and compared to the findings of 
similar studies. Then, the results will be rationalized. 
4.1 Event 1 
4.1.1 German sample 
The abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns experienced by E.ON, RWE and EnBW 
during the Fukushima reactor meltdown will now be presented. On the event day, the ARs with 
the MRM for E.ON and RWE are positive and even significant at the 5% level for E.ON (Table 
1.1 in Appendix B). Only the AR of EnBW is negative, yet insignificant. These results come at 
a surprise, as it was expected the ARs would be negative for all three companies on the day of 
the event. On day 1, the ARs for E.ON and RWE are negative and highly significant, 
being -3,93% and -3,62% respectively. For both companies the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
return can be rejected at the 1% level. On day 2 the ARs of all three companies is negative, yet 
not significant. At the end of event 1, the CAR is negative for all three companies. However, 
only the CAR of RWE (-3,51%) rejects the null hypothesis of no cumulative abnormal return 
at the 5% level. 
The results of the CMRM show a much more significant impact of event 1 on the three German 
companies. Although, the ARs for E.ON and RWE are again positive on the day of the event, 
they are far smaller and not significant. On day 1 and 2, the ARs of both companies are negative 
and highly significant. Especially on day 1, the ARs of E.ON (-5,35%) and RWE (-4,77%) 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level. For EnBW, the ARs and CARs are negative on all 
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event days, but, again, the values are not significant. On day 2, E.ON and RWE have a CAR of 
-7,09% and -7,67%, rejecting the null hypothesis at the 1% level. 
For both the MRM and the CMRM, the results of the SARs and CSARs are very similar to the 
T-statistics of the ARs and CARs (Table 1.2 in Appendix B). For instance, with the MRM the 
SAR of E.ON on day 1 is -3,93, while the T-statistic of the AR that day is -3,96. The fact that 
these values are so similar makes sense, since the SAR is calculated by standardizing the AR 
by its standard deviation, which is exactly how the T-statistic is calculated. The only difference 
is that for the SAR the standard error is adjusted by the predicted error. That adjustment explains 
the slight difference between the results. The fact that the difference is so small, strengthens the 
validity of the test results for the ARs and CARs, as there seem to be only small discrepancies 
between the standard error and the adjusted standard error. 
The ACSAR of the MRM is -1,15 and rejects the null hypothesis of the event having no effect 
on the sample at the 5% level (Table 4.1). For the CMRM, the ACSAR on day 2 is -2,35 and 
significant at the 1% level. These results show that event 1 had a significant negative impact on 
German nuclear power providers. These results are consistent across both models. 
 
Event 1 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - Germany 
   MRM  CMRM 
Sample Event Day  ACSAR Z  ACSAR Z 
Germany 0  1,1796 2,0431  0,3831 0,6635 
 1  -1,0261 -1,7772  -1,6420 -2,8440 
 2  -1,1462 -1,9853  -2,3517 -4,0733 
Table 4.1: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal return of the German 
sample during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 
 
Lastly, to test the robustness of the parametric test results, it makes sense to also look at the 
nonparametric test results (Table 1.3 in Appendix B). The significance values of the generalized 
sign test reveal that the fraction of positive ARs during event 1 is not significantly different to 
the fraction estimated over the event window for both the MRM and CMRM. Hence, they fail 
to reject the null hypothesis. This could be explained by the two positive ARs on day 0 in 
conjunction with the small sample size. The rank test reveals a significance value of 1,13 with 
the MRM and a value of 2,27 with the CMRM. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
return can only be rejected for the CMRM. The results of the MRM are not consistent across 
parametric and nonparametric tests. 
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Based on the test results of both models for ARs, CARs and ACSAR, as well as the partially 
consistent results between parametric and nonparametric tests, it can be concluded that the 
Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdown had a negative financial impact on the stock returns of 
German nuclear power providers. 
4.1.2 EU sample 
EDF, Iberdrola, GNF and Fortum are the only companies from the EU sample with significant 
abnormal returns on any of the event days with the MRM (Table 1.4 in Appendix B). With -
4,58% on day 1, EDF experiences the most significant AR of the sample, which rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 1% level. GNF also has a highly significant positive AR that day with +3,86%. 
EDF, Iberdrola and GNF have the only significant CARs of the sample, being -5,10%, +3,48% 
and +5,74% respectively. They reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level, although, in different 
directions. 
The results of the CMRM show a similar pattern, with Fortum having the only significant AR 
(-2,66%) on the event day. The AR of EDF (-5,38%) on day 1 is, again, the most significant 
AR of the entire sample. EDF (-8,11%) and Endesa (-5,71%) are the only companies with 
significant CARs at the end of the period. They reject the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5% 
level respectively. Similar to the results of the German sample, the effects of event 1 seem to 
be more negative with the CMRM than with the MRM. 
The values of the SARs and CSARs for this sample are very similar to the T-statistics of the 
ARs and CARS (Table 1.5 in Appendix B). Hence, the same conclusion can be drawn as for 
the German sample. The difference between the standard error and the adjusted standard error 
seems to be very small, strengthening the validity of the test results of the ARs and CARs. 
With the MRM, the ACSAR of the EU sample is only 0,53 and not significant (Table 4.2). For 
the CMRM, on the other hand, the ACSAR is -1,07 and it rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% 
level. Based on the results of the CMRM, it can be said that event 1 had a negative impact on 
nuclear power providers in the EU. 
 
Event 1 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - EU 
   MRM  CMRM 
Sample Event Day  ACSAR Z  ACSAR Z 
EU 0  0,1515 0,4009  -0,4919 -1,3014 
 1  -0,4039 -0,9893  -1,1663 -2,8568 
 2  0,5295 1,4010  -1,0739 -2,8412 
Table 4.2: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal return of the EU sample 
during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 
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The results of the generalized sign test show that the fraction of positive ARs is not significantly 
different between the event and the estimation window for both the MRM and CMRM (Table 
1.6 in Appendix B). The values for the rank test show that the ARs of the EU sample are only 
significant in the CMRM (2,47), where it rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level. These 
results are consistent with the results of the ACSAR and support the argument that the effects 
of event 1 seem to be more negative with the CMRM than with the MRM. 
Based on the results of the CMRM for ARs, CARs and ACSAR, which are mostly consistent 
across parametric and nonparametric tests, it can be argued that the Fukushima incident had a 
negative impact on the stock returns of nuclear power providers in the EU. This conclusion is 
only valid, if the assumption is made that the CMRM is better suited to measure the abnormal 
returns for this event. 
4.2 Event 2 
4.2.1 German sample 
The results of the MRM show that E.ON and RWE have ARs of -2,18% and -1,56% on the day 
of Chancellor Merkel’s announcement (Table 2.1 in Appendix B). They reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. On none of the other days in the event 
window, does either one of the three companies have significant ARs. Furthermore, the CAR 
of E.ON (-3,70%) is the only CAR that is significant in the German sample. 
With the CMRM, the ARs across the sample are even less significant than with the MRM. The 
only AR that is significant at the 10% level is the AR of E.ON (-2,27%) on day 0. Although the 
CARs of all three companies are negative at the end of the event period, they fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no cumulative abnormal return. 
As it was the case with event 1, the values of the SARs and CSARs are, again, only slightly 
different to the T-statistics of the ARs and CARs for both the MRM and CMRM (Table 2.2 in 
Appendix B). 
The ACSAR of the German sample is negative and significant for both models (Table 4.3). The 
ACSAR of the MRM is -1,31 and rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level. For the CMRM, 
the ACSAR of -1,00 is slightly lower and only significant at the 10% level. These results come 
at a surprise, since the CARs for most companies in the sample were not significant for both 
models. This could be explained by the fact that with the ACSAR, the values of the CSARs are 
standardized to make them identically distributed. That is one of the underlying assumptions 
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when analysing ARs. Therefore, it can be argued that the ACSAR produces more accurate 
results than the conventional CAR. 
 
Event 2 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - Germany 
   MRM  CMRM 
Sample Event Day  ACSAR Z  ACSAR Z 
Germany -2  -0,0675 -0,1168  -0,4071 -0,7051 
 -1  -0,6321 -1,0949  -0,6460 -1,1190 
 0  -1,0534 -1,8245  -0,9100 -1,5762 
 1  -1,0578 -1,8321  -0,5307 -0,9192 
 2  -1,3090 -2,2672   -1,0023 -1,7360 
Table 4.3: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal return of the German 
sample during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 
 
The nonparametric tests also offer split results (Table 2.3 in Appendix B). The significance 
values of the generalized sign test for the MRM (1,29) and CMRM (0,59) show that the null 
hypothesis of equal fractions of ARs in the event and estimation window cannot be rejected. 
The rank test yields values of 3,29 for the MRM and 2,30 for the CMRM, which means that the 
null hypothesis of no abnormal return can be rejected at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
These results strengthen the inference that can be drawn from the ACSAR values, since they 
are not based on the same distribution assumptions. 
In the end, the highly significant negative ACSARs and consistency across the rank test, as well 
as the significant negative ARs for E.ON and RWE on the day of the event, support the 
following conclusion. The announcement of Chancellor Merkel had a negative financial impact 
on the stock returns of German nuclear power providers. 
4.2.2 EU sample 
For the EU sample, the only significant ARs occur with the MRM on day 0 for Fortum (+2,67%) 
and on day 2 for EDF (-2,28%) (Table 2.4 Appendix B). Both ARs reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5% level. Particularly, in the case of EDF there is doubt whether or not this AR is connected 
to the event in question, since there are not even remotely significant ARs on day 0 or day 1. 
The CARs of all companies in the sample fail to reject the null hypothesis, even at the 10% 
level. 
The results of the CMRM are consistent with the results of the MRM. The only significant ARs 
are experienced by EDF and Fortum on the same days, although slightly less significant for 
Fortum. The CARs of all companies in the sample are, again, not significant. 
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The SARs and CSARs are also similar to the T-statistics of the ARs and CARs (Table 2.5 in 
Appendix B). These results are consistent with the similarities found for the German sample. 
The ACSARs of the EU sample are -0,01 for the MRM and 0,13 for the CMRM, which means 
that the values are not significant (Table 4.4). These results are consistent with the results of 
the CARs and support the argument that event 2 had no impact on nuclear power providers in 
the EU. 
 
Event 2 - Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return - EU 
   MRM  CMRM 
Sample Event Day  ACSAR Z  ACSAR Z 
EU -2  0,2463 0,6515  -0,0038 -0,0100 
 -1  -0,1178 -0,3116  0,0442 0,1171 
 0  0,1779 0,4707  0,2206 0,5837 
 1  0,0643 0,1700  0,4484 1,1863 
 2  -0,0081 -0,0213   0,1252 0,3312 
Table 4.4: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal return of the EU sample 
during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 
 
The nonparametric tests show similar results (Table 2.6 in Appendix B). The significance 
values of the generalized sign test are not significant for the MRM (0,05) and CMRM (0,21). 
The values of rank test also fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Based on the results of the ARs, CARs, ACSARs and nonparametric tests, it can be concluded 
that the announcement of Chancellor Merkel had no impact on the stock returns of other nuclear 
power providers in the EU. 
4.3 Extended event period 
This chapter shows how the results hold up under longer event windows. The event window of 
event 1 was increased to six days (0, 5), so that it covers the entire week after the Fukushima 
incident. The situation in Fukushima was most critical until 15 March. However, it is possible 
that the market reacted to new information beyond that date. The period of event 2 was 
increased to eight days (-5, 0, 2), so that it covers the entire week leading up to Chancellor 
Merkel’s announcement. That way, more effects related to anticipation can be included. The 
goal is to see if the significance of the CARs increases, as they potentially capture more of the 
effects associated with the events. 
In the German sample for event 1, the distribution of significant CARs with the MRM and 
CMRM is the same as in the shorter event window (Table 1 in Appendix C). However, the 
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significance values are lower in almost all cases, although the CARs of E.ON (-8,39%) and 
RWE (-8,45%) are slightly higher with the CMRM. The significance values are lower, because 
the significance is tested over a longer period of time and the magnitude of the CARs only 
increased slightly. For the EU sample, the CAR of EDF is actually much more significant with 
the longer event period, while the CAR of Iberdrola is no longer significant. The CARs of most 
other companies are slightly more significant, but they remain below the 10% level. The 
significance of the ACSAR from the extended event period is lower for both samples, than it is 
with the shorter period (Table 2 in Appendix C). Based on these results, it is fair to say that the 
shorter event period more accurately captures the effects of the Fukushima reactor meltdown 
for both samples. Although, for some individual companies, like EDF, the extended event 
period produces more significant results. 
The CARs off all companies in the German sample are less significant in the extended period 
of event 2 (Table 3 in Appendix C). The CAR of E.ON, which was significant at the 10% level 
in the shorter event period, is no longer significant at that level with the MRM. The CARs of 
all companies in the EU sample remain not significant in the extended event period. The 
ACSARs for the German sample are no longer significant, as opposed to the ACSARs of the 
shorter event period (Table 4 in Appendix C). The ACSARs of the EU sample remain not 
significant. Based on these results, it can be argued that including the full week before 
Chancellor Merkel’s announcement, does not capture the effects of event 2 more accurately. In 
the case of the German sample, it would even lead to the conclusion that Merkel’s 
announcement has no effect on German nuclear power providers. With the exception of EnBW, 
there was arguably enough liquidity in the stock of these European utility companies to claim 
that the market reacted efficiently to the new information. For that reason and the more 
significant test results, it was concluded that the original event windows for event 1 and 2 are 
better suited to capture the effect of the events. 
4.4 Comparison to other studies 
Chapter 2.2.3 introduced two event studies similar to the one of this paper. The one by Betzer 
et al. (2011: 24) used a sample of German nuclear power providers consisting of E.ON, RWE 
and EnBW. The one by Ferstl et al. (2012: 32) only included E.ON and RWE in their German 
sample. Both studies found that the ARs of their sample companies were positive on the day of 
the earthquake (11 March). On the following trading day (14 March), they both noted highly 
significant negative ARs. On 15 March, they also found negative ARs for their samples, but 
less significant. These findings are consistent with the results of the MRM used in this paper. 
However, the results of the CMRM are slightly different since they show significant negative 
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ARs for 15 March as well. Betzer et al. also used the MRM and Ferstl et al. used the Fama and 
French’s three-factor model, which would explain why their findings are more similar to the 
results of the MRM from this study. 
The results for event 2 cannot be compared to other literature, since there are no other event 
studies conducted on that event. 
4.5 Validation 
Before the results can be analysed, it is necessary to see if the three assumptions presented in 
chapter 2.1.3 are true. The assumptions, formulated by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), were 
that markets are efficient, the event unanticipated and there are no confounding events during 
the event period. 
4.5.1 Market efficiency 
As explained in chapter 2.1.1, the effect of an event is not expected to persist for long after the 
event took place if the market is deemed efficient. To test this, the ARs of event 1 and event 2 
were observed over a 10-day period after the event. This test was exclusively conducted on the 
German sample with the ARs of the MRM, as the German market is the focus of this thesis. 
For event 1, there are no significant ARs for any of the three companies beyond day 1 (Table 1 
in Appendix D). Hence, it can be concluded that the market was quick to factor in the 
information of the Fukushima reactor meltdown in the company’s stock price. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the market’s quick reaction. The only inefficiency of note is the fact that the market 
did not seem to react to the information on the day of the event. This will be further discussed 
in chapter 5.1. 
The only significant ARs immediately surrounding event 2 occur on the day of the event (Table 
2 in Appendix D). Four to six days after the event, all companies also experience significant 
ARs. However, these can be explained by other events that are only partially related to event 2. 
For instance, day 6 was the day after the cabinet passed the decision announced by Chancellor 
Merkel on day 0. The market potentially reacted to the decision being set in stone. Whether that 
is the market reacting inefficiently or reacting to new information can be argued either way. 
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Figure 4.1: This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW over a 
period starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after the day of the earthquake in Japan. 
 
Figure 4.2: This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW over a 
period starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after the day of Merkel’s announcement. 
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4.5.2 Anticipation 
Due to the nature of event 1, it can be said with absolute certainty that the market did not 
anticipate the event. In the case of event 2, it is possible that the announcement made by 
Chancellor Merkel, regarding the future of nuclear power in Germany, was anticipated. After 
the Fukushima incident, there was an open political discussion and based on the stance of 
politicians in that discussion, the announcement made on 30 May could have been anticipated. 
All companies experience significantly positive or negative ARs days prior to the event day. 
This could indicate that there is speculation about the outcome of the event. The fluctuations 
seen in the CARs right before the event, strengthen this argument (Figure 4.2). It cannot fully 
be dismissed that the market did not, to some degree, anticipate the decision reached on 30 
May. The strong reaction on the day of the event, however, suggests that there was a lot of 
uncertainty leading up to the event. The chance of insider trading is also slim, since the decision 
announced by Chancellor Merkel was reached by multiple parties negotiating that day. 
4.5.3 Confounding events 
For the German sample, no confounding events were recognized for either event. On 14 May, 
the sudden announcement of the nuclear moratorium almost certainly had an impact on the 
share price of German nuclear power providers. Since it was a reaction of the German 
government to the Fukushima incident, the event was not regarded as a separate event. 
In the EU sample, Iberdrola was arguably affected by a confounding event during event 1. On 
day 1, it was announced that Qatar Holdings purchased 6% of shares to become one of the 
major shareholder of the company (Iberdrola, 2011). This could have overshadowed potential 
negative effects related to event 1. Therefore, the AR of Iberdrola was eliminated from the 
sample that day. 
During event 1 and 2, there were no other confounding events recognized for the companies of 
either sample. The fact that the event windows of both events are very short, reduce the risk of 
confounding effects.  
5 Discussion of findings 
The discussion will exclusively focus on the findings of the German sample, as that is in line 
with the research question of this dissertation. This chapter will start off by discussing the 
results of event 1 and will then move on to event 2. 
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5.1 Event 1 
The results showed, that the Fukushima reactor meltdown had a significant negative effect on 
the stock returns of German nuclear power providers. In chapter 3.2.1, two possible reasons 
were given on why the event could affect these companies negatively. These theories will now 
be expanded upon. 
According to the first theory, the event reminded investors to reassess the risk involved when 
dealing with nuclear energy. This could happen in two ways. First, they could reassess the 
probability of such an event taking place. Second, they could reassess the loss for the company 
if it takes place. Regarding the former, it has to be kept in mind how rare incidents like 
Fukushima are. Nuclear power has been a source of energy since the 1950s. In all that time, 
there have only been two incidents comparable to Fukushima. These are TMI in 1979 and 
Chernobyl in 1986. For that reason, it can be assumed that investors perceived the risk of 
another reactor meltdown to occur as very small. After the incident, their perception must have 
changed. Furthermore, investors were painfully reminded how severe the financial and social 
implications of such an event can be. In addition to TEPCO losing its power plant, 200.000 
people had to be relocated. These are massive financial and reputational losses for the company, 
which investors of E.ON or RWE will keep in mind when assessing their risk-adjusted return. 
The second theory was that investors could potentially anticipate new government policies, 
making the generation of nuclear power costlier. For instance, new safety standards or rigorous 
security checks could be introduced, which would increase the cost of maintenance. 
Furthermore, older power plants could be forced to shut down out of safety concerns. In both 
cases, the expected future cash flows of the nuclear power plants would decrease. Since the 
share price is said to be based on the discounted value of a company’s expected future cash 
flows, its share price would also be expected to decrease. 
Contrary to that rationale, the ARs of E.ON and RWE were very positive on the day of the 
earthquake with the MRM. This market reaction could be explained by one of two reasons. The 
first reason is that the news of the tsunami having seriously damaged the Fukushima power 
plant broke too late that day, giving the market not enough time to properly react to that 
information. The ARs are based on the closing prices of XETRA, which has its market close at 
5:30 p.m. local time. Based on the “tagesschau” newsfeed, news about the Fukushima power 
plant having problems with its cooling system were first reported at 10:46 a.m. that day. In the 
early afternoon, it was reported that a state of emergency was called and the first civilians 
around Fukushima had been ordered to evacuate (ARD, 2011). On that basis, it can be argued 
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that the market had enough time to react to the information, which means the first reason can 
be dismissed. 
The second reason is that news about the casualties and damages caused by the tsunami 
overshadowed the news about Fukushima that day. As a result, other industries in Germany 
could have been affected more strongly. Since the ARs were calculated with the MRM, the 
values are sensitive to changes in the market portfolio (DAX). Particularly, insurance 
companies drove the index down that day, as they were arguably affected by the news of the 
tsunami. Therefore, the positive ARs with the MRM could be explained by the market as a 
whole reacting stronger to the news about the tsunami than E.ON and RWE. This argument is 
supported by the results of the CMRM. The CMRM is not sensitive to the return of the market 
and it shows no significant ARs for either company that day. For that reason, the CMRM can 
be argued to be better suited to capture ARs for this event.  
The situation in Fukushima severely worsened over the weekend, drawing much more media 
attention towards it. On Monday, E.ON and RWE suffered their most significant negative ARs, 
as the market reacted to the catastrophic events that unfolded in Fukushima. This reaction is in 
line with the two theories presented above. Particularly, the anticipation described in the second 
theory proved to be a valid concern, since the German government announced the nuclear 
moratorium on 14 May. As a result, eight power plants were forced to be shut down for 3-
months. E.ON, RWE and EnBW were directly affected by this decision, as their capacity to 
produce energy was unexpectedly diminished. Unless they were able to compensate this loss in 
capacity, their expected future cash flows would also be lower. That could explain the negative 
stock returns of these companies. As explained in chapter 3.3.1, the small ARs of EnBW can 
be explained by the small number of shares being in free float at that time. 
5.2 Event 2 
The results showed that the announcement made by Chancellor Merkel also had a negative 
financial impact on stock returns of German nuclear power providers. Contrary to event 1, this 
event had a direct impact on the three companies. 
The rationale behind the negative effect is twofold. For one, the new policy decisions 
announced by Chancellor Merkel severely diminished the expected future cash flows from each 
companies’ nuclear power business. After all, the eight nuclear power plants shut down during 
the moratorium were forced to remain switched off. Furthermore, all remaining nine nuclear 
power plants were to be shut down gradually until 2022. Only eight months before, all power 
plants received a life time extension of 12 years on average, with the prospect of further 
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extensions. In light of that, this is a severe reduction of electricity generating capacity for all 
companies and explains the negative ARs. 
The second reason that could explain the negative effect of this announcement is that there was 
uncertainty about how E.ON, RWE and EnBW would cope with the challenge of drastically 
changing the way they generate electricity. What made this challenge especially difficult, were 
the ambitious climate goals set by the EU and the German government. By 2020, Germany 
wants to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions by 40%, compared to 1990 levels. The goals for 
2050 are even more ambitious with 80% to 90%. To make sure that energy companies work 
towards achieving these goals, they are required to purchase carbon permits, which effectively 
means that they are paying a tax on their 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 emissions. In their annual reports of 2010, E.ON, 
RWE and EnBW state that their long-term strategy is to systematically decarbonize their power 
generation by transitioning to renewable energy. Since nuclear energy produces close to no 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 
emissions, all three companies seemed to rely heavily on it, to fulfil the climate goals set by the 
government. In the annual report of RWE (2010: 10f), Executive Vice-President Gerd Jäger 
states, “Nuclear energy as a compliment to renewables is the best solution.” Additionally, the 
report explains that it would be impossible to uphold the climate goals without nuclear energy. 
What further cements their commitment to this technology is the fact that over the past 10 years 
RWE invested €1,4 billion into improving the safety of their Biblis power plant alone (RWE, 
2010: 11). In light of the decision made on 30 May, these investments seem to have been in 
vain. With a lack of alternatives, it is reasonable to assume that investors deemed the process 
of transitioning from nuclear energy to other low emission sources of energy to be difficult and 
less profitable, at least in the short-run. The results of the MRM were deemed to be more 
accurate for event 2, since its effects are believed to be stronger directed towards one particular 
industry, as opposed to the market as a whole. 
5.3 Financial impact 
In this chapter the aggregated financial impact of both events on German nuclear power 
providers will be measured. For that, the CARs will be multiplied by the market capitalization 
of each company the day before the respective event window begins and then aggregated across 
companies. Event 1 will use the CARs of the CMRM and event 2 the CARs of the MRM. The 
financial impact of event 1 is EUR -4,76 billion and the financial impact of event 2 is EUR -2,18 
billion (Table 5). The aggregate impact of both events on German nuclear power providers is 
EUR -6,94 billion. This is also the answer to the research question of this dissertation. 
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Financial Impact on German Nuclear Power Providers 
 Event1  Event 2  Aggregated 
Company CAR (%) Loss (€ mil.)  CAR (%) Loss (€ mil.)  Loss (€ mil.) 
E.ON -7,09% -2.706,60  -3,70% -1.244,83  -3.951,43 
RWE -7,67% -1.944,22  -2,99% -659,39  -2.603,61 
EnBW -1,08% -108,18  -2,91% -274,84  -383,02 
Total  -4.759,00   -2.179,06  -6.938,06 
Table 5: This table shows the individual and aggregated financial impact of the Fukushima reactor 
meltdown and Merkel’s announcement on German nuclear power providers. The CAR from the CMRM 
was used for event 1 and the CAR from the MRM for event 2. 
 
6 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to measure the financial impact of the Fukushima reactor meltdown on the 
stock returns of German nuclear power providers. It was recognized that the Fukushima 
incident affected these companies beyond the event itself, as it sparked a change to the political 
climate towards nuclear power. Therefore, a significant political event was identified. An event 
study methodology was used to measure the effects of both events on a German sample and an 
EU sample, which served as a comparison. The results showed that the Fukushima reactor 
meltdown had a significant negative effect on nuclear power providers of both samples. These 
results were consistent across the MRM and CMRM, although the CMRM was deemed to better 
capture the effects. The negative effect was explained by investors reassessing the risk involved 
when dealing with nuclear power and their reaction to new Government policies that reduced 
the expected future cash flows of the companies. The results of the second event showed that 
the announcement made by Chancellor Merkel also had a significant negative effect on German 
nuclear power providers. However, it did not have a significant effect on other nuclear power 
providers in the EU, meaning that the effect seems to be isolated to the German industry. The 
negative effects in Germany could be explained by the market, again, reacting to the decrease 
in expected future cashflows and the uncertainty in regard to how the affected companies will 
cope with the challenge of changing their business strategy. Overall, the financial loss 
experienced by shareholders of E.ON, RWE and EnBW was EUR -6,94 billion. The results of 
this dissertation should make investors more aware of the risk involved when investing in 
certain industries. This case in particular highlights that everything in the world is connected. 
It proves that the waves of an earthquake happening in Japan, can have massive implications 
on an industry on the other side of the globe. Therefore, investors should be watchful and 
always look for connections. 
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Undeniably, the effects of the events were negative to shareholders of the affected companies. 
Nevertheless, in can be argued that the society as a whole, at least in Germany, benefited from 
these events. Before Fukushima, the Government was in support of nuclear power and there 
was no foreseeable time when nuclear power would be replaced by more sustainable sources 
of energy. All the energy companies did invest in renewable energy, however, at a relatively 
slow rate. To fulfil the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 goals set by the government, they used nuclear energy as a stand-in 
for renewable energy. After 30 May, this was no longer possible. In the end, it can be said that 
the political decisions that followed Fukushima paved the way for a faster transition towards 
renewable energy and a more sustainable future. 
Lastly, there are also some limitations when it comes to this study. There are only a small 
number of publicly traded nuclear power providers in Europe. Therefore, the size of both 
samples was relatively small. This could negatively influence the validity of some of the test 
results and makes it difficult to make a general inference for the industry as a whole. Moreover, 
the effects of other relevant political and corporate events related to Fukushima were not 
captured in this study’s results. Including more events, could lead to a more accurate 
approximation of the true financial impact. This was deemed beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but it is something future studies can look into. There are multiple other ways the 
results of this thesis could be expanded upon in future work. Regarding the methodology, 
additional methods could be used to estimate the expected returns, like the CAPM or the Fama 
and French three-Factor model. That way, there are more options to determine which model is 
best suited to capture the effects of the event. Furthermore, the sample could be increased to 
nuclear power providers in Asia and the U.S. By doing so, the effects of the event on the 
industry worldwide can be assessed. The validity of the test results can also be expected to 
increase with a bigger sample size. 
To conclude, this study revealed the financial impact of the Fukushima reactor meltdown on 
the stock returns of German nuclear power providers. The results offered new insights on the 
topic and made a valuable contribution to the ever-growing literature of event studies. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Abnormal Returns from the Estimation Window 
 E.ON  RWE  EnBW  German Sample  EU Sample 
Statistics MRM CMRM  MRM CMRM  MRM CMRM  MRM CMRM  MRM CMRM 
Mean 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000 
Median 0,0004 0,0007  0,0004 0,0005  -0,0002 -0,0002  0,0002 0,0003  -0,0002 0,0003 
Variance 0,0001 0,0002  0,0001 0,0001  0,0002 0,0002  0,0001 0,0002  0,0001 0,0003 
Standard Deviation 0,0099 0,0135  0,0093 0,0118  0,0153 0,0154  0,0115 0,0136  0,0111 0,0158 
Standard Error 0,0006 0,0009  0,0006 0,0007  0,0010 0,0010  0,0007 0,0009  0,0007 0,0010 
Maximum 0,0315 0,0335  0,0358 0,0298  0,1459 0,1460  0,0711 0,0698  0,0403 0,0711 
Minimum -0,0676 -0,0956  -0,0625 -0,0532  -0,0553 -0,0559  -0,0618 -0,0682  -0,0442 -0,0588 
Excess Kurtosis 9,7313 10,2252  10,7970 3,3807  33,6094 33,4542  18,0459 15,6867  2,3644 3,6669 
Skewness -1,4230 -1,6424  -1,5420 -0,7347  3,2034 3,1659  0,0795 0,2629  -0,0436 0,0752 
Table 1: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the abnormal returns from the estimation window, calculated with the MRM and CMRM. It includes 
the statistics for E.ON, RWE and EnBW individually, and the German and EU samples as a whole. 
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Appendix B: Event study results 
 
Event 1 - Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return - Germany 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
E.ON 0  0,0208 2,0927 0,0208 2,0927  0,0106 0,7840 0,0106 0,7840 
 1  -0,0393 -3,9573 -0,0185 -1,3185  -0,0535 -3,9636 -0,0429 -2,2483 
 2  -0,0006 -0,0577 -0,0191 -1,1099  -0,0279 -2,0691 -0,0709 -3,0303 
            
RWE 0  0,0147 1,5818 0,0147 1,5818  0,0065 0,5497 0,0065 0,5497 
 1  -0,0362 -3,9034 -0,0215 -1,6416  -0,0477 -4,0261 -0,0412 -2,4582 
 2  -0,0135 -1,4585 -0,0351 -2,1825  -0,0355 -2,9987 -0,0767 -3,7384 
            
EnBW 0  -0,0016 -0,1055 -0,0016 -0,1055  -0,0027 -0,1747 -0,0027 -0,1747 
 1  -0,0018 -0,1177 -0,0034 -0,1578  -0,0033 -0,2148 -0,0060 -0,2754 
 2  -0,0019 -0,1248 -0,0053 -0,2009  -0,0048 -0,3112 -0,0108 -0,4046 
Table 1.1: This table shows the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, 
calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 
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Event 1 - SAR and CSAR - Germany 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  SAR CSAR  SAR CSAR 
E.ON 0  2,0834 2,0834  0,7805 0,7805 
 1  -3,9304 -1,3060  -3,9365 -2,2316 
 2  -0,0566 -1,0990  -2,0290 -2,9936 
        
RWE 0  1,5748 1,5748  0,5472 0,5472 
 1  -3,8768 -1,6278  -3,9986 -2,4405 
 2  -1,4302 -2,1548  -2,9405 -3,6903 
        
EnBW 0  -0,1051 -0,1051  -0,1739 -0,1739 
 1  -0,1168 -0,1569  -0,2134 -0,2738 
 2  -0,1223 -0,1988  -0,3052 -0,3998 
Table 1.2: This table shows the standardized abnormal returns and cumulative standardized abnormal 
returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, calculated with the MRM 
and the CMRM. 
 
Event 1 - Nonparametric Tests - Germany 
Sample Test MRM CMRM 
Germany Generalized Sign Test 0,9808 0,9715 
 Rank Test 1,1319 2,2730 
Table 1.3: This table shows the nonparametric test results of the German 
sample during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, calculated with the MRM 
and the CMRM. The nonparametric tests consist of the generalized sign test 
and the Corrado rank test. 
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Event 1 - Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return - EU 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
EDF 0  -0,0076 -0,6874 -0,0076 -0,6874  -0,0139 -1,0029 -0,0139 -1,0029 
 1  -0,0458 -4,1339 -0,0534 -3,4092  -0,0538 -3,8698 -0,0677 -3,4455 
 2  0,0024 0,2204 -0,0510 -2,6563  -0,0134 -0,9639 -0,0811 -3,3698 
            
Engie 0  0,0086 0,9868 0,0086 0,9868  -0,0019 -0,1156 -0,0019 -0,1156 
 1  0,0021 0,2431 0,0107 0,8696  -0,0111 -0,6769 -0,0130 -0,5604 
 2  0,0009 0,1050 0,0117 0,7707  -0,0254 -1,5455 -0,0385 -1,3498 
            
Endesa 0  -0,0143 -1,2093 -0,0143 -1,2093  -0,0223 -1,4033 -0,0223 -1,4033 
 1  -0,0108 -0,9154 -0,0251 -1,5024  -0,0209 -1,3161 -0,0432 -1,9229 
 2  0,0062 0,5206 -0,0190 -0,9262  -0,0139 -0,8743 -0,0571 -2,0748 
            
Iberdrola 0  0,0190 1,9019 0,0190 1,9019  0,0072 0,3901 0,0072 0,3901 
 1  0,0175 1,7532 0,0365 2,5845  0,0027 0,1441 0,0099 0,3777 
 2  0,0158 1,5849 0,0348 2,4655  -0,0137 -0,7369 -0,0064 -0,2452 
            
GNF 0  0,0157 1,2985 0,0157 1,2985  0,0062 0,3543 0,0062 0,3543 
 1  0,0386 3,1805 0,0543 3,1671  0,0265 1,5143 0,0327 1,3212 
 2  0,0031 0,2552 0,0574 2,7333  -0,0208 -1,1870 0,0119 0,3935 
            
CEZ 0  0,0085 0,6487 0,0085 0,6487  0,0037 0,2516 0,0037 0,2516 
 1  0,0025 0,1885 0,0110 0,5920  -0,0036 -0,2483 0,0000 0,0023 
 2  0,0212 1,6199 0,0321 1,4186  0,0091 0,6251 0,0091 0,3628 
            
Fortum 0  -0,0203 -1,8708 -0,0203 -1,8708  -0,0266 -1,9420 -0,0266 -1,9420 
 1  -0,0128 -1,1826 -0,0331 -2,1590  -0,0208 -1,5168 -0,0473 -2,4457 
 2  0,0322 2,9720 -0,0009 -0,0470  0,0165 1,2024 -0,0309 -1,3027 
Table 1.4: This table shows the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of all companies in the EU sample during the Fukushima reactor 
meltdown, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM.  
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Event 1 - SAR and CSAR - EU 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  SAR CSAR  SAR CSAR 
EDF 0  -0,6853 -0,6853  -0,9998 -0,9998 
 1  -4,1182 -3,3966  -3,8551 -3,4329 
 2  0,2184 -2,6472  -0,9552 -3,3545 
        
Engie 0  0,9837 0,9837  -0,1153 -0,1153 
 1  0,2421 0,8668  -0,6743 -0,5583 
 2  0,1040 0,7678  -1,5315 -1,3400 
        
Endesa 0  -1,2055 -1,2055  -1,3989 -1,3989 
 1  -0,9120 -1,4973  -1,3111 -1,9162 
 2  0,5159 -0,9247  -0,8663 -2,0648 
        
Iberdrola 0  1,8959 1,8959  0,3888 0,3888 
 1  1,7465 2,5756  0,1436 0,3765 
 2  1,5705 2,4511  -0,7302 -0,2414 
        
GNF 0  1,2944 1,2944  0,3531 0,3531 
 1  3,1684 3,1557  1,5085 1,3164 
 2  0,2529 2,7226  -1,1763 0,3957 
        
CEZ 0  0,6467 0,6467  0,2508 0,2508 
 1  0,1878 0,5900  -0,2474 0,0024 
 2  1,6052 1,4085  0,6195 0,3596 
        
Fortum 0  -1,8649 -1,8649  -1,9359 -1,9359 
 1  -1,1781 -2,1517  -1,5110 -2,4374 
 2  2,9450 -0,0565  1,1915 -1,3022 
Table 1.5: This table shows the standardized abnormal returns and cumulative standardized abnormal 
returns of all companies in the EU Sample during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, calculated with the 
MRM and the CMRM. 
 
Event 1 - Nonparametric Tests - EU 
Sample Test MRM CMRM 
EU Generalized Sign Test 1,1642 1,0200 
 Rank Test -1,5776 2,4770 
Table 1.6: This table shows the nonparametric test results of the EU sample 
during the Fukushima reactor meltdown, calculated with the MRM and the 
CMRM. The nonparametric tests consist of the generalized sign test and the 
Corrado rank test. 
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Event 2 - Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return - Germany 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
E.ON -2  -0,0008 -0,0786 -0,0008 -0,0786  -0,0079 -0,5862 -0,0079 -0,5862 
 -1  -0,0014 -0,1374 -0,0021 -0,1527  0,0038 0,2823 -0,0041 -0,2149 
 0  -0,0218 -2,1982 -0,0239 -1,3938  -0,0227 -1,6822 -0,0268 -1,1466 
 1  -0,0050 -0,5038 -0,0289 -1,4590  0,0097 0,7204 -0,0171 -0,6328 
 2  -0,0081 -0,8150 -0,0370 -1,6694  -0,0173 -1,2833 -0,0344 -1,1399 
            
RWE -2  -0,0006 -0,0636 -0,0006 -0,0636  -0,0063 -0,5338 -0,0063 -0,5338 
 -1  -0,0067 -0,7261 -0,0073 -0,5584  -0,0026 -0,2179 -0,0089 -0,5315 
 0  -0,0156 -1,6764 -0,0229 -1,4238  -0,0163 -1,3753 -0,0252 -1,2280 
 1  -0,0052 -0,5618 -0,0281 -1,5140  0,0066 0,5585 -0,0186 -0,7843 
 2  -0,0018 -0,1934 -0,0299 -1,4406  -0,0092 -0,7787 -0,0278 -1,0497 
            
EnBW -2  -0,0009 -0,0616 -0,0009 -0,0616  -0,0017 -0,1102 -0,0017 -0,1102 
 -1  -0,0251 -1,6327 -0,0260 -1,1981  -0,0245 -1,5942 -0,0262 -1,2052 
 0  0,0164 1,0659 -0,0097 -0,3628  0,0163 1,0576 -0,0100 -0,3734 
 1  0,0028 0,1827 -0,0068 -0,2228  0,0044 0,2828 -0,0056 -0,1820 
 2  -0,0222 -1,4457 -0,0291 -0,8458  -0,0232 -1,5059 -0,0288 -0,8363 
Table 2.1: This table shows the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW during Merkel’s announcement, calculated 
with the MRM and the CMRM. 
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Event 2 - SAR and CSAR - Germany 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  SAR CSAR  SAR CSAR 
E.ON -2  -0,0784 -0,0784  -0,5843 -0,5843 
 -1  -0,1370 -0,1523  0,2816 -0,2141 
 0  -2,1937 -1,3909  -1,6788 -1,1440 
 1  -0,5002 -1,4546  0,7153 -0,6331 
 2  -0,8117 -1,6641  -1,2782 -1,1379 
        
RWE -2  -0,0634 -0,0634  -0,5321 -0,5321 
 -1  -0,7242 -0,5569  -0,2173 -0,5299 
 0  -1,6730 -1,4206  -1,3726 -1,2251 
 1  -0,5578 -1,5092  0,5545 -0,7837 
 2  -0,1926 -1,4360  -0,7755 -1,0478 
        
EnBW -2  -0,0614 -0,0614  -0,1098 -0,1098 
 -1  -1,6284 -1,1949  -1,5900 -1,2020 
 0  1,0638 -0,3614  1,0555 -0,3720 
 1  0,1814 -0,2223  0,2808 -0,1818 
 2  -1,4398 -0,8428  -1,4999 -0,8334 
Table 2.2: This table shows the standardized abnormal returns and cumulative standardized abnormal 
returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM and the 
CMRM. 
 
Event 2 - Nonparametric Tests - Germany 
Sample Test MRM CMRM 
Germany Generalized Sign Test 1,2887 0,5866 
 Rank Test 3,2921 2,3049 
Table 2.3: This table shows the nonparametric test results of the German 
sample during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM and the 
CMRM. The nonparametric tests consist of the generalized sign test and the 
Corrado rank test. 
  
 44 
Event 2 - Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return - EU 
  MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat  AR T-Stat CAR T-Stat 
EDF -2 -0,0022 -0,2003 -0,0022 -0,2003  -0,0044 -0,3177 -0,0044 -0,3177 
 -1 -0,0024 -0,2128 -0,0046 -0,2921  0,0017 0,1258 -0,0027 -0,1357 
 0 -0,0028 -0,2496 -0,0073 -0,3826  -0,0037 -0,2682 -0,0064 -0,2656 
 1 -0,0093 -0,8409 -0,0167 -0,7518  -0,0011 -0,0777 -0,0075 -0,2689 
 2 -0,0228 -2,0551 -0,0394 -1,5915  -0,0292 -2,1016 -0,0367 -1,1804 
           
Engie -2 -0,0042 -0,4859 -0,0042 -0,4859  -0,0079 -0,4797 -0,0079 -0,4797 
 -1 -0,0079 -0,9036 -0,0121 -0,9826  -0,0011 -0,0639 -0,0089 -0,3844 
 0 -0,0056 -0,6384 -0,0177 -1,1709  -0,0072 -0,4358 -0,0161 -0,5654 
 1 -0,0014 -0,1582 -0,0191 -1,0931  0,0123 0,7490 -0,0038 -0,1152 
 2 -0,0049 -0,5655 -0,0240 -1,2306  -0,0156 -0,9502 -0,0194 -0,5280 
           
Endesa -2 0,0012 0,0989 0,0012 0,0989  -0,0016 -0,1014 -0,0016 -0,1014 
 -1 -0,0005 -0,0440 0,0006 0,0388  0,0047 0,2945 0,0031 0,1365 
 0 0,0000 0,0034 0,0007 0,0336  -0,0012 -0,0741 0,0019 0,0687 
 1 0,0017 0,1472 0,0024 0,1027  0,0122 0,7658 0,0140 0,4424 
 2 0,0070 0,5908 0,0094 0,3561  -0,0012 -0,0728 0,0129 0,3631 
           
Iberdrola -2 0,0066 0,6566 0,0066 0,6566  0,0025 0,1333 0,0025 0,1333 
 -1 -0,0063 -0,6359 0,0002 0,0147  0,0013 0,0699 0,0038 0,1437 
 0 0,0047 0,4752 0,0050 0,2863  0,0030 0,1595 0,0067 0,2094 
 1 -0,0037 -0,3752 0,0012 0,0604  0,0116 0,6253 0,0183 0,4940 
 2 0,0035 0,3460 0,0047 0,2087  -0,0085 -0,4597 0,0098 0,2362 
           
GNF -2 0,0158 1,3008 0,0158 1,3008  0,0125 0,7109 0,0125 0,7109 
 -1 -0,0047 -0,3860 0,0111 0,6468  0,0015 0,0865 0,0140 0,5639 
 0 0,0022 0,1830 0,0133 0,6338  0,0008 0,0438 0,0147 0,4857 
 1 0,0103 0,8458 0,0236 0,9718  0,0227 1,2944 0,0374 1,0678 
 2 0,0040 0,3314 0,0276 1,0174  -0,0057 -0,3245 0,0317 0,8100 
           
CEZ -2 0,0017 0,1327 0,0017 0,1327  0,0001 0,0042 0,0001 0,0042 
 -1 0,0020 0,1515 0,0037 0,2010  0,0051 0,3513 0,0052 0,2514 
 0 0,0145 1,1089 0,0182 0,8043  0,0138 0,9457 0,0189 0,7512 
 1 -0,0067 -0,5157 0,0115 0,4388  -0,0005 -0,0315 0,0185 0,6348 
 2 0,0138 1,0586 0,0253 0,8658  0,0089 0,6138 0,0274 0,8423 
           
Fortum -2 0,0025 0,2317 0,0025 0,2317  0,0003 0,0238 0,0003 0,0238 
 -1 -0,0095 -0,8777 -0,0070 -0,4568  -0,0054 -0,3966 -0,0051 -0,2636 
 0 0,0267 2,4605 0,0197 1,0476  0,0257 1,8795 0,0206 0,8699 
 1 -0,0040 -0,3704 0,0157 0,7220  0,0042 0,3059 0,0248 0,9063 
 2 -0,0080 -0,7393 0,0076 0,3152  -0,0144 -1,0538 0,0104 0,3393 
Table 2.4: This table shows the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of all companies in 
the EU sample during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 
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Event 2 - SAR and CSAR - EU 
   MRM  CMRM 
Company Event Day  SAR CSAR  SAR CSAR 
EDF -2  -0,1999 -0,1999  -0,3170 -0,3170 
 -1  -0,2123 -0,2915  0,1255 -0,1354 
 0  -0,2491 -0,3818  -0,2677 -0,2651 
 1  -0,8376 -0,7494  -0,0774 -0,2683 
 2  -2,0486 -1,5865  -2,0949 -1,1769 
        
Engie -2  -0,4849 -0,4849  -0,4787 -0,4787 
 -1  -0,9014 -0,9802  -0,0638 -0,3836 
 0  -0,6371 -1,1682  -0,4349 -0,5643 
 1  -0,1575 -1,0905  0,7460 -0,1156 
 2  -0,5637 -1,2275  -0,9472 -0,5270 
        
Endesa -2  0,0987 0,0987  -0,1011 -0,1011 
 -1  -0,0439 0,0387  0,2937 0,1362 
 0  0,0034 0,0336  -0,0740 0,0685 
 1  0,1466 0,1024  0,7628 0,4407 
 2  0,5889 0,3549  -0,0726 0,3617 
        
Iberdrola -2  0,6552 0,6552  0,1330 0,1330 
 -1  -0,6343 0,0148  0,0697 0,1433 
 0  0,4743 0,2859  0,1592 0,2089 
 1  -0,3737 0,0607  0,6229 0,4924 
 2  0,3449 0,2086  -0,4583 0,2354 
        
GNF -2  1,2980 1,2980  0,7094 0,7094 
 -1  -0,3851 0,6455  0,0863 0,5627 
 0  0,1826 0,6325  0,0437 0,4846 
 1  0,8425 0,9690  1,2894 1,0644 
 2  0,3304 1,0144  -0,3235 0,8073 
        
CEZ -2  0,1325 0,1325  0,0041 0,0041 
 -1  0,1511 0,2005  0,3504 0,2507 
 0  1,1067 0,8027  0,9438 0,7496 
 1  -0,5136 0,4383  -0,0314 0,6335 
 2  1,0552 0,8640  0,6118 0,8403 
        
Fortum -2  0,2312 0,2312  0,0238 0,0238 
 -1  -0,8756 -0,4556  -0,3956 -0,2630 
 0  2,4556 1,0457  1,8757 0,8682 
 1  -0,3690 0,7211  0,3047 0,9043 
 2  -0,7370 0,3154  -1,0504 0,3390 
Table 2.5: This table shows the standardized abnormal returns and cumulative standardized abnormal 
returns of all companies in the EU Sample during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM 
and the CMRM. 
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Event 2 - Nonparametric Tests - EU 
Sample Test MRM CMRM 
EU Generalized Sign Test 0,0454 0,2147 
 Rank Test 0,0889 -0,5959 
Table 2.6: This table shows the nonparametric test results of the EU sample 
during Merkel’s announcement, calculated with the MRM and the CMRM. 




Appendix C: Extended event window 
 
Extended Event 1 - CAR (0, 5) 
   MRM  CMRM 
Sample Company  CAR T-Stat  CAR T-Stat 
Germany E.ON  -0,0325 -1,3384  -0,0839 -2,5362 
 RWE  -0,0432 -1,9014  -0,0845 -2,9120 
 EnBW  -0,0016 -0,0419  -0,0070 -0,1849 
        
EU EDF  -0,0913 -3,3641  -0,1190 -3,4971 
 Engie  0,0092 0,4287  -0,0370 -0,9172 
 Endesa  -0,0256 -0,8852  -0,0607 -1,5605 
 Iberdrola  0,0167 0,7475  -0,0201 -0,4849 
 GNF  0,0640 2,1546  0,0221 0,5160 
 CEZ  0,0516 1,6096  0,0304 0,8526 
 Fortum  0,0313 1,1794  0,0037 0,1108 
Table 1: This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns of all companies in the German and EU 
samples for the extended period surrounding the Fukushima reactor meltdown. The CARs were 
calculated with the MRM and CMRM. 
 
Extended Event 1 - ACSAR (0, 5) 
  MRM  CMRM 
Sample  ACSAR Z  ACSAR Z 
Germany  -1,0796 -1,8698  -1,8489 -3,2025 
EU  0,2625 0,6946  -0,7050 -1,8653 
Table 2: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of the 
German and EU samples for the extended period surrounding the Fukushima reactor 
meltdown. The CARs were calculated with the MRM and CMRM. 
 
Extended Event 2 - CAR (-5, 0, 2) 
   MRM  CMRM 
Sample Company  CAR T-Stat  CAR T-Stat 
Germany E.ON  -0,0172 -0,6127  -0,0272 -0,7129 
 RWE  -0,0146 -0,5573  -0,0227 -0,6773 
 EnBW  -0,0253 -0,5833  -0,0264 -0,6064 
        
EU EDF  -0,0389 -1,2408  -0,0454 -1,1564 
 Engie  -0,0259 -1,0498  -0,0368 -0,7913 
 Endesa  0,0123 0,3676  0,0040 0,0887 
 Iberdrola  0,0226 0,8005  0,0104 0,1983 
 GNF  0,0512 1,4928  0,0413 0,8330 
 CEZ  0,0058 0,1570  0,0008 0,0194 
 Fortum  0,0104 0,3389  0,0039 0,0997 
Table 3: This table shows the cumulative abnormal returns of all companies in the German and EU 
samples for the extended period surrounding Merkel’s announcement. The CARs were calculated with 
the MRM and CMRM. 
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Extended Event 2 - ACSAR (-5, 0, 2) 
  MRM  CMRM 
Sample  ACSAR Z  ACSAR Z 
Germany  -0,5785 -1,0021  -0,6584 -1,1404 
EU  0,1228 0,3249  -0,0993 -0,2628 
Table 4: This table shows the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns of the 
German and EU samples for the extended period surrounding Merkel’s announcement. 
The CARs were calculated with the MRM and CMRM. 
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Appendix D: Validation 
 
Event 1 - Abnormal Return (MRM) - Germany 
   E.ON  RWE  EnBW 
Date Event Day  AR T-Stat  AR T-Stat  AR T-Stat 
25.02.11 -10  -0,0119 -1,2025  -0,0069 -0,7454  -0,0004 -0,0255 
28.02.11 -9  -0,0051 -0,5114  -0,0127 -1,3701  -0,0013 -0,0823 
01.03.11 -8  -0,0092 -0,9268  -0,0077 -0,8257  0,0006 0,0400 
02.03.11 -7  0,0012 0,1231  0,0003 0,0346  -0,0004 -0,0287 
03.03.11 -6  -0,0058 -0,5803  0,0006 0,0639  0,0002 0,0143 
04.03.11 -5  0,0042 0,4196  -0,0009 -0,0988  0,0008 0,0546 
07.03.11 -4  0,0024 0,2450  -0,0008 -0,0841  -0,0015 -0,0962 
08.03.11 -3  -0,0020 -0,2039  0,0047 0,5069  0,0011 0,0711 
09.03.11 -2  -0,0088 -0,8852  -0,0010 -0,1056  -0,0031 -0,2014 
10.03.11 -1  0,0113 1,1364  0,0114 1,2318  0,0064 0,4190 
11.03.11 0  0,0208 2,0927   0,0147 1,5818   -0,0016 -0,1055 
14.03.11 1  -0,0393 -3,9573  -0,0362 -3,9034  -0,0018 -0,1177 
15.03.11 2  -0,0006 -0,0577  -0,0135 -1,4585  -0,0019 -0,1248 
16.03.11 3  0,0061 0,6174  -0,0111 -1,1974  0,0096 0,6240 
17.03.11 4  -0,0041 -0,4117  0,0081 0,8707  -0,0053 -0,3422 
18.03.11 5  -0,0155 -1,5616  -0,0051 -0,5506  -0,0006 -0,0365 
21.03.11 6  -0,0106 -1,0717  -0,0060 -0,6480  0,0007 0,0479 
22.03.11 7  0,0059 0,5925  0,0030 0,3252  0,0008 0,0548 
23.03.11 8  0,0037 0,3724  0,0034 0,3687  -0,0014 -0,0893 
24.03.11 9  -0,0053 -0,5343  -0,0007 -0,0721  -0,0006 -0,0411 
25.03.11 10  0,0003 0,0281  0,0078 0,8393  -0,0004 -0,0246 
Table 1: This table shows the abnormal returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW over a period starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after 
the day of the earthquake in Japan. The ARs were calculated with the MRM. 
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Event 2 - Abnormal Return (MRM) - Germany 
   E.ON  RWE  EnBW 
Date Event day  AR T-Stat  AR T-Stat  AR T-Stat 
16.05.11 -10  -0,0066 -0,6652  -0,0127 -1,3675  0,0000 -0,0021 
17.05.11 -9  0,0078 0,7867  0,0080 0,8647  -0,0359 -2,3386 
18.05.11 -8  -0,0020 -0,2049  -0,0040 -0,4259  -0,0033 -0,2153 
19.05.11 -7  -0,0058 -0,5841  -0,0048 -0,5148  -0,0044 -0,2884 
20.05.11 -6  -0,0052 -0,5197  -0,0010 -0,1086  -0,0076 -0,4925 
23.05.11 -5  -0,0054 -0,5445  -0,0073 -0,7860  0,0004 0,0242 
24.05.11 -4  0,0041 0,4100  0,0040 0,4280  -0,0105 -0,6854 
25.05.11 -3  0,0212 2,1344  0,0186 2,0031  0,0139 0,9027 
26.05.11 -2  -0,0008 -0,0786  -0,0006 -0,0636  -0,0009 -0,0616 
27.05.11 -1  -0,0014 -0,1374  -0,0067 -0,7261  -0,0251 -1,6327 
30.05.11 0  -0,0218 -2,1982   -0,0156 -1,6764   0,0164 1,0659 
31.05.11 1  -0,0050 -0,5038  -0,0052 -0,5618  0,0028 0,1827 
01.06.11 2  -0,0081 -0,8150  -0,0018 -0,1934  -0,0222 -1,4457 
02.06.11 3  0,0013 0,1357  -0,0070 -0,7516  0,0195 1,2721 
03.06.11 4  -0,0151 -1,5237  -0,0288 -3,1026  -0,0187 -1,2148 
06.06.11 5  -0,0186 -1,8709  -0,0042 -0,4569  -0,0146 -0,9518 
07.06.11 6  0,0299 3,0132  0,0213 2,2934  -0,0315 -2,0499 
08.06.11 7  0,0161 1,6242  0,0039 0,4169  0,0221 1,4388 
09.06.11 8  0,0058 0,5847  0,0024 0,2534  0,0010 0,0640 
10.06.11 9  -0,0100 -1,0034  -0,0128 -1,3798  0,0152 0,9879 
13.06.11 10  0,0006 0,0647  0,0008 0,0912  -0,0422 -2,7484 
Table 2: This table shows the abnormal returns of E.ON, RWE and EnBW over a period starting 10 days before and ending 10 days after 
the day of Merkel’s announcement. The ARs were calculated with the MRM. 
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Appendix E: Company names 
 
Companies 
Sample Company Name Abbreviation 
Germany E.ON SE E.ON 
 RWE AG RWE 
 Energie Baden-Württemberg AG EnBW 
   
EU Électricité de France SA EDF 
 Engie SA Engie 
 Endesa S.A. Endesa 
 Iberdrola S.A. Iberdrola 
 Gas Natural Fenosa GNF 
 České Energetické Závody a.s. CEZ 
 Fortum Oyj Fortum 
Table 1: This table lists the names and abbreviations of all companies in the 
German and EU sample. 
